Assuming that Trump is right that Ghalibaf and his camp want to end the war, there is no mechanism for them to overpower their rivals, and there is no referee to side with them.
By Shay Khatiri, Middle East Forum
President Donald Trump has made differing demands of the Islamic Republic of Iran throughout the war.
These requests range from unconditional surrender to a negotiated agreement that would restrict Iran’s nuclear program and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. So far, Iran has agreed to none.
The president believes, and reports suggest, that the regime is divided over a deal. In the past, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei played the referee amidst disagreements.
Today, the absence of a strong supreme leader has paralyzed Iran’s decision-making.
The highest-profile example is the nuclear negotiations that preceded the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
President Hassan Rouhani, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, and then-Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani reportedly favored diplomacy, while other elements favored a more confrontational posture.
Khamenei sided with the Rouhani camp, enabling the deal.
This changed. After finishing his tenure as foreign minister, Zarif said that he and Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani disagreed over prioritizing “the battlefield or diplomacy,” and Soleimani always triumphed. Again, Khamenei was the tie-breaker.
If reports are true, the regime is once again split. Speaker of the Parliament Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf and President Masoud Pezeshkian prefer a deal, while Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Ahmad Vahidi and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr oppose a deal.
The supporters of the two camps aired their grievances against each other when Raja News and Tasnim News Agency, both hardline outlets, lashed out at each other over a negotiated settlement.
There are four more actors to note. The position of Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Eje’i is unclear, but he carries weight.
The position of the chairman of the Expediency Council is Sadegh Larijani, Eje’i’s predecessor as chief justice, is also unknown.
According to a report by Iran International, Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian sought to oust Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, worried that he was doing the anti-diplomacy side’s bidding.
Last, Israeli intelligence believes that there was an attempt to remove Ghalibaf from the negotiating team and replace him with Saeed Jalili, the former nuclear negotiator. Jalili is popular among the regime’s base and favors resistance.
It is possible that Ghalibaf wants an agreement. More than ideological, he is corrupt. Whatever principles he might voice, he would violate them for money and power.
Nor is he alone. There has been a divide within the security forces for some time.
Most Guard members care about the plight of the Iranian people, but the hardline minority is more powerful and wealthier.
Therein lies the problem. Assuming that Trump is right that Ghalibaf and his camp want to end the war, there is no mechanism for them to overpower their rivals, and there is no referee to side with them.
Even if Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is alive, he is closely controlled, and Ghalibaf does not seem to have direct access to him to make his case.
If Mojtaba wants a deal, it is also unclear whether the Pretorian Guard, to which he owes his position, will allow him.
Trump could change this dynamic by resuming war. But instead of attacks on Iran’s strategic capabilities, the U.S. and Israeli militaries should eliminate the figures who are impediments to an agreement, beginning with Vahidi, Zolghadr, and Jalili.
In effect, Trump should act as the new supreme leader, refereeing by drone and Tomahawk disputes within the Islamic Republic.
Ghalibaf wants Washington to believe that he is trying to end the war diplomatically through authorized leaks.
In one, he reportedly said that the opponents of diplomacy “want to destroy Iran.” Plausibly, this is a signal to the United States to remove them from his way.
Trump believes that the regime is divided. He should then do something about it. The depleted U.S. munitions stockpiles make the previous strategy unwise—the United States expended a quarter to a half of its key munitions over 39 days.
The blockade will take a long time to bear fruit, and domestic U.S. politics and economic turmoil mean that Iran might outlast it. The remaining alternative is enabling a quasi-coup within the regime.
Backed by the elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who believe a change is necessary, Ghalibaf might be able to get his way but, again, he will need the U.S. military’s help to remove internal regime forces seeking to oust him.
